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The Use of Forensic DNA in
Criminal Cases in Kentucky
as Compared with Selected Other States
BY JUDITH E. LEWTER*
INTRODUCTION
T he use of technology to examine DNA1 strands in biological
and medical fields has been around for many years, but its
development m the area of forensic science began m the mid-1980s by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI').2 The first case in which
DNA was used by the FBI m the United States was m December, 1988.
By the middle of 1989, however, after much publicity involving DNA,
serious questions began to be raised m various scientific, legal, and
forensic communities about its reliability and validity 3
Part I of this Note discusses some of the technical aspects of DNA
typing, or "DNA fingerprinting" as it is sometimes inaccurately called,5
* J.D. expected 1998, Umversity of Kentucky. The author wishes to thank
the Fayette County Legal Aid Society for the use of its Resource Library. Also,
special thanks to L. Skunk.
'Deoxyribonucleic Acid. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 480 (6th ed. 1990).
2 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC
SCIENCE 1 (1992). This Note will deal exclusively with the use of DNA m
criminal cases, since its use m civil cases, mostly paternity cases, does not
involve the same problems and constitutional issues, nor the same admissibility
issues. See also J.E.B. v. State, 606 So.2d 156 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992), rev'd on
other grounds, 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
3 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 1.
4 See znfra notes 11-58 and accompanying text.
' The term "DNA fingerprinting" generally is used incorrectly in the United
States, since DNA fingerprinting refers specifically to a certain technique m the
analysis of DNA which is not often used in this country. See NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 4. The term is also incorrect in the sense
that it is undoubtedly a subtle attempt to borrow from the credibility of true
fingerprint identification to bolster its own credibility, although there are
considerable major differences in the identification techniques involved. See id.
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and its inextricable symbiotic brother,6 population genetics and the
"product rule."7 Part Il discusses the legal requirements for the intro-
duction of scientific testimony in general, and DNA m particular, in
criminal cases. Part I 9 focuses on technical problems associated with
the admissibility of DNA evidence and the statistical probabilities
garnered from population genetics. Finally, Part IV discusses how
Kentucky and selected other states have come to grips with the issues
involved.
I. WHAT IS FORENSIC DNA TECmNOLOGY9
A. In General
DNA is the active substance in all genes, carrying "the coded
messages of heredity m every living thing: animals, plants, bacteria, and
other microorganisms."" Forensic DNA is the application of the use of
DNA to legal issues, particularly for identification purposes. The DNA
makeup of every human is unique, with the exception of identical
twins.2 Each strand of DNA from the chromosome set of a single cell
is approximately 1.5 meters m length. Since there are 100 trillion cells in
the human body, there are ninety-three billion miles of DNA m each
person, which equates to approximately 1000 times the distance from the
Earth to the sun. 3
It is impossible to compare such great lengths of DNA to each other.
And yet, since each 1.5-meter strand in each chromosome is repeated
throughout all of the cells, if only that portion (1.5 meters) could be
compared with another source, any match would be absolute. However,
even that type of comparison cannot presently be done. Currently, only
at 112-13.
6 The National Research Council has stated that it is meaningless to say that
two DNA patterns match without stating the frequency in which such a match
could occur by random chance. See id. at 9.
7 Id. at 76.
s See infra notes 59-101 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 102-80 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 181-258 and accompanying text.
"NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 2.
12 See id. at 3, 74.
, See Roger Kahn, An Introduction to DNA Structure and Genome
Organization, in FORENsIC DNA TECHNOLOGY 25, 26 (Mark A. Farley & James
J. Harrmngton eds., 1991).
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a very tiny portion of a strand is compared with a similar section from
another source m order to determine if the two samples could have come
from the same source. A negative match is absolute. That is, if the
laboratory finds that two samples are dissimilar, the inescapable
conclusion is that they do not match and so are not from the same
source.
1 4
If there is a match between the two samples, it is necessary to
compute the probability of such a match occurring between samples taken
from randomly chosen sources. 5 If the probability of a random match
is determined to be sufficiently low, the match is strong evidence that the
two samples came from the same person, rather than being a mere
coincidence. 6 Thus, the prosecution would argue, the person whose
DNA sample matches the crime scene sample is guilty of the crime being
investigated. Sometimes, however, the probability of a random match is
not so persuasive, as in the New York City bombing of the World Trade
Center, three percent of the population could have shared the same DNA
characteristics as those in the sample of saliva found on an envelope that
had been licked. This computed probability narrowed the group of
potential suspects to just over 330,000 people in New York City alone,
including the defendant, who could have been the source of the saliva.
This obviously was not a powerful piece of evidence. 7
B. Techniques for Analyzing and Identifying Samples of DNA
1. Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphisms ("RFLP")
The most commonly used method to compare DNA samples is called
the Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphisms test, generally referred
to as RFLP This test requires a larger sample 8 than other methods used
,4 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 9, 74-75.
, See discussion infra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
16 In some cases the odds of a random match have been estimated at one in
many millions, or even billions. See, e.g., Martinez v. State, 549 So.2d 694 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (one in 234 billion); Andrews v. State, 533 So.2d 841 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (one in more than 800 million); Spencerv Commonwealth,
384 S.E.2d 775 (Va. 1989) (one in 135 million blacks).
7 See Ronald S. Ostrowski, PCR, DQ9, and Polymarkers: A New Genera-
tion of Forensic DNA Profiling, TRIAL BRIEFs 24-25 (Winter 1994-95).
8 Compare Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Admissibility of DNA
Identification Evidence, 84 A.L.R. 4th 313, 320 (1991) (stating that a sample of
blood the size of a quarter, or a sample of semen the size of a dime, would be
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to compare DNA samples,19 but gives a better probability of a match.
RFLP takes advantage of the fact that each strand of DNA is composed
of strings of four types of nucleotides, commonly represented by the
letters A, C, G, and T, that occur in different combinations and
lengths.2" Stated in the sinplest terms, RFLP involves extracting a
sufficient quantity of DNA from the samples to be compared and then
analyzing the combinations of A, C, G, and T bases, along with the
lengths of each base,2 in a seven-step process.22
The first step is the extraction of the DNA from the tissue sample and
its purification by the addition of certain chemicals. Once the DNA is
separated and purified, certain enzymes, called restriction enzymes, are
added to the DNA. These enzymes cut the DNA strands at certain points
by recognizing specific sequences of base pairs. The lengths of these
resulting fragments of DNA vary in each individual.23
Next is a critical step called electrophoreses,24 where the fragment
lengths of DNA are placed parallel to each other in separate tracks at one
end of an agarose gel. A positive electrode is placed at the other end of
the gel. Since the DNA strands carry a negative charge, they move
toward the positive charge. Since shorter fragments travel faster than
longer fragments, the technician can determine the length of a fragment
by how far it travels through the gel in the allotted time.25
needed for RFLP tests); Margann Bennett, Comment, Admissibility Issues of
Forensic DNA Evidence, 44 U. KAN. L. REV 141, 146 (1995) (citing U.S.
CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, Genetic Witness: Forensic
Uses ofDNA Tests 47 (1990)) (stating that a sample of blood the size of a dime,
or a sample of semen the size of an eraser, would be needed for RFLP analysis).
19 One such method is the Polymerase Chain Reaction test. See discussion
znfra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
20 There are approximately three billion nucleotides m each set of 23
chromosomes. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 3. The letters
A, C, G, and T stand for the bases adenine, cytosme, guanine, and thymine,
respectively. See id. at 2.
21 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 3-4.
22 For a more detailed and technical discussion of the procedure, see
Fleming, supra note 18, at 320-22, and Janet C. Hoeffel, Note, The Dark Side
ofDNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant,
42 STAN. L. REv 465, 471-74 (1990).
See Bennett, supra note 18, at 146-47
24 See infra notes 102-35 and accompanyingtext for a discussion ofpossible
problems associated with this step.
25 See Bennett, supra note 18, at 147
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The results of the procedure thus far cannot be seen, so a fourth step
is necessary to help make the fragments of DNA visible. A process called
Southern blotting, or Southern transfer, is used to transfer the fragments
from the gel to a nylon membrane. This is called a blot. At the same
time, a chemical is used to split the base pairs on each fragment in half,
lengthwise. This process is akin to unzipping a zipper.26
The fifth step, hybridization,27 involves locating various VNTRs 8
on the blot.29 To determine these locations, the nylon blot is dipped in
a solution of single-stranded30 radioactive probes3' that have been
chemically engineered to band with an identical sequence of base pairs
m the sample. Tis has the effect of placing a recognizable mark at each
location. The blots are then cleaned of any unbonded probes.32
In order to analyze the results, the nylon blot is then placed on a
piece of x-ray film and left for a period of time, from a few hours to
several days.33 The radioactive probes expose the film, creating a picture
that has been described as superficially resembling the bar graphs on
items in a grocery store.34 Tis is called an autoradiograph,35 or auto-
rad for short. The probes show up as black bands on the autorad, and
since they are interlocked with the VNTRs, the location and size of the
VNTRs can be found.36
The next step is the comparison of the bands on the tracks created
from the crime scene sample with the bands on the tracks created from
the sample from the suspect (the "otherwise known" sample).37 If the
location and distribution of the bands on the tracks are not the same,
26 See id. at 147-48.
27 See id. at 148.
28 VNTR stands for Variable Number of Tandem Repeats. See Leonard J.
Deftos, Daubert & Frye: Compounding the Controversy Over the Forensic Use
of DNA Testing, 15 WHrrrIR L. REv 955, 961 (1994).
29 VNTRs are small segments of base pairs in the DNA that are tandemly
attached and repeated frequently. See Bennett, supra note 18, at 145.
30 See id. at 148.
31 See Deftos, supra note 28, at 961 (the average test consists of three to
four probes, each producing six to eight bands).
32 See Bennett, supra note 18, at 148.
33 See Id.
31 See Deftos, supra note 28, at 961.
31 See id.
36 See Bennett, supra note 18, at 148-49. This is the so-called "DNA print."
Id.
37 See zd. at 149.
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there is no match, and the negative result is said to be conclusive.38 If
the location and distribution of the bands on the tracks are similar
enough39 to each other,40 there is said to be a match, which means, at
this point, only that the suspect is "not excluded."' 41 The next step is to
determine the significance of the match.42
2. Polymerase Chain Reaction ("PCR")
Another method of DNA identification is the Polymerase Chain
Reaction ('TCR") procedure which is named after TAQ polymerase, the
enzyme used m the process.43 The technique utilizes a much smaller
sample than RFLP and has less ability to maximize the significance of
possible matches.' In this process, the sample of DNA to be used is
again extracted, purified, and mixed with chemicals, including the TAQ
polymerase enzyme. During successive cycles in a heating device, a
specific "gene of interest" will be replicated billions of times.45 Then the
amplified DNA is flooded over a nylon membrane that is marked with
specific probes, each of which is designed to recognize one variant of the
"gene of interest," called an allele.46 Wherever the probe recognizes a
specific allele, a visible dot appears on the membrane.47
To determine if two DNA samples have come from the same person,
it is necessary to examine the results to see if they have produced the
38 See id. (citing United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 793 (2d Cir.
1992)).
" See id. (explaining that the "match does not have to be exact" for a match
to be declared).
40 Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 793 (stating that the FBI will declare a match if the
number of base pairs in the two bands differs less than 2.5%); Fishback v
People, 851 P.2d 884, 888 (Colo. 1993) (stating that one private laboratory
requires that the length of two fragments be within one millimeter of each other
to declare a match).
4' Deftos, supra note 28, at 962.
42 See infra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
41 See Fleming, supra note 18, at 322-23.
"See Hoeffel, supra note 22, at 474.
4 See Fleming, supra note 18, at 323.
46 An allele is "one of two or more alternative forms of a gene" that
occupies the same locus on homologous chromosomes. NATIONAL RESEARCH
COuNcIL, supra note 2, at 75, 167
47 See Fleming, supra note 18, at 323.
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same pattern of dots.4" If the results have not produced the same pattern
of dots, there is no match between the two samples, so they could not
have come from the same source.49 If the dot patterns do match, another
step must be performed, as with RFLP, to determine the significance of
the match.
C. The Use of Population Genetics and the Product Rule
Despite the fact that the DNA profiling technique is referred to by
some as "DNA fingerprinting," a match in a DNA test does not mean the
same thing as a match of actual fingerprints. Typically, when a match of
fingerprints is found, the result is regarded as an absolute. When a DNA
match is found, it can only be stated that the person whose DNA is said
to be a match with the crime scene sample can be included in the class
of persons whose DNA could match.5° It is still necessary to ascertain
the size of that class for the sigmficance of the match to be determined.
Since humans are more alike than different in our physical makeup
(two arms, legs, hands, etc.), much of the DNA pattern will be identical
from one person to another. However, it has been calculated that any two
human genomes51 differ at approximately three million sites. Therefore,
if enough of those three million sites could be compared, a unique
identification would theoretically be possible. At the present time,
however, only a very few of those sites - typically three to five - are
examined and analyzed, and it is possible that two persons could have the
same DNA pattern at those few sites.52 The question then becomes, what
are the odds of such a random match? This is where population genetics
and the product rule come into the picture.
Using a specific database with as few as 200 to 30053 people to
represent the entire population, the first step in the process is to determine
the frequency of the occurrence in that database of the specific allele type
48 See id.
49 DNA exclusions are easy to interpret. If techmcal aspects are different
between two samples, it is definitive proof that the samples did not come from
the same source. See NATIONAL RESEARCH CouNciL, supra note 2, at 75.
5 See id. at 112 (stating that "only when DNA technology is capable of
sequencing the entire three billion base pairs of a person's genome could a DNA
pattern be considered to be as constant and complete as a fingerprint pattern").
"' The genome is the entire set of heredity factors m an orgamsm as
contained in the chromosomes. See id. at 3, 169.
52 See Id. at 74.
" See Hoeffel, supra note 21, at 489.
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found at each of the loci (sites) used in the sample.54 Thus, even if the
database being used has only 500 people, the result of the second step
(multiplying the possibility of identical alleles at different locus points)
can result in a staggeringly low probability, such as one in a billion,55
or even one m thirty billion.16 It is this set of numbers that gives the
DNA findings their teeth. When a random match is said to be one in
thirty billion, or even turty million, such a small possibility of an
innocent explanation for the match between a sample taken from a
suspect and a sample found at the crime scene can have a devastating
effect on a jury 7 The numbers usually generated by the PCR test are
not nearly as high, which is one of the disadvantages of this test from the
prosecution's viewpoint.
58
II. LEGAL CONSiDERATIONS FOR
ADMuSSmBTy IN CRMNAL CASES
A. The Frye Hearing
In evaluating the admissibility of scientific testimony in criminal
cases, most courts, including those in Kentucky,59 followed the stand-
ard set forth in Frye v. United States6" until it was overruled in
54 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 75-76.
-s See id. at 76.
56 See Hoeffel, supra note 22, at 488-89 (citing Alec J. Jeffreys et al.,
Hypervariable "Minisatellite' Regions in Human DNA, 314 NATURE 67, 68
(1985)).
57 See State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989). The frequency
expressed was one in 33 billion, and the court refused to admit these numbers
due to their potentially exaggerated impact on the jury. See id. at 424, 428-29.
58 See George F Sensabaugh & Cecilia Von Beroldingen, The Polymerase
Chain Reaction: Application to the Analysis ofBiologicalEvdence, n FORENSIC
DNA TECHNOLOGY 63, 78 (Mark A. Farley & James J. Harrington eds., 1991).
'9 See Harris v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 678 (Ky. 1992), overruled by
Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 100 (Ky. 1995).
60 Frye v. United States, 293 F 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Tis case involved
testimony offered by a defense expert concerning the results of an early
forerunner of a polygraph test, the "systolic blood pressure deception test."
61 Technically it was not overruled. The Supreme Court construed Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 as superseding Frye, and thus Frye was dead. See Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993); znfra notes 70-
91 and accompanying text.
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1993.62 In rejecting the testimony offered, the Frye court stated that
before scientific testimony could be introduced, "the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gamed general
acceptance in the particular field m which it belongs."'63 The court
concluded that the test offered had not yet gamed such understanding and
scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities
as to justify its introduction.'
Most jurisdictions, including Kentucky, conducted a "Frye" hear-
ing before trial to determine if proffered scientific testimony had
been generally accepted in the scientific community 65 This was the
standard applied when most of the DNA cases arose.66 There has been
virtually no dispute that the underlying technology of DNA profiling
has been generally accepted in the scientific community 67 Therefore,
using the Frye test, most courts6" that have considered the issue
have concluded that DNA profiling procedures and results are admssi-
ble.
69
B. The Daubert Hearing
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.70 did not involve or
discuss the admissibility of DNA but simply the admissibility of expert
scientific evidence in general. The Court determined that Frye was no
longer relevant with the passage of Federal Rule of Evidence ("TRE")
702, which deals with the admissibility of scientific evidence in federal
6 2 id.
63 Frye, 293 F at 1014.
' See id.
65 See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
66 Apparently, tlus standard was construed as being more ngid than Federal
Rule 702. In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court reversed the lower
courts' decisions disallowing certain expert testimony on the ground that such
evidence did not satisfy the standard set forth in Frye. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at
579.
67 See Barry C. Scheck, DNA and Daubert, Scientific Evidence After the
Death of Frye, Criminal Forensics and DNA Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV
1959, 1962 (1994) (citing NATIONAL RESEARCH CouNCIL, supra note 2).
68 See infra notes 242-58 and accompanying text, discussing cases
disallowing the introduction of DNA evidence on bases other than the Frye
standard.69 But see infra notes 102-80.
70 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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courts, and discussed the new standards to be applied.7 FRE 702
provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact m issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.72
The Court stated that "[n]othing in the text of this Rule establishes
'general acceptance' as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility, '73 and
that adopting a "rigid 'general acceptance' requirement'" would be
contrary to the "liberal thrust'" of the Federal Rules and their "general
approach of relaxing the traditional bamers to 'opinion testimony "76
The Court proceeded to provide some "general observations ' 7 to help
the trial judge assess the admissibility of disputed scientific evidence by
evaluating whether the "reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid and whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.' 7' A key
question for the trial judge is whether the scientific theory or technique
can be or has been tested.79
71 See id. at 587
72 FED. R. EvlD. 702. Kentucky adopted an identical rule that became
effective in July 1992. See KY. R. EviD. 702. See Mitchell v. Commonwealth,
908 S.W.2d 100 (Ky. 1995) (upholding the admission of DNA evidence against
a defendant).
7' Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
74 Id. The Court called the general acceptance test "uncompromising." Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Ramey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
77Id. at 593. In a concurring-m-part, dissenting-m-part opinion, Clhef
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, criticized the majority for these
"observations," calling them unnecessary, too general, vague, and abstract. See
id. at 598.
78 Id. at 592-93.
7" The Court stated: "'Scientific methodology today is based on generating
hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified."' Id. (quoting
Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic
Substances Litigation: The Legacy ofAgent Orange andBendectinLitigation, 86
N.W L. REV 643, 645 (1992)). Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his concurring/
dissenting opinion, said, "I am at a loss to know what is meant when it is said
that the scientific status of a theory depends on its 'falsifiability,' and I suspect
[Vol. 86
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Other general considerations discussed by the Court include whether
the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publica-
tion,"o the rate of error of a particular scientific technique,"1 and the
general acceptance standard inherited from Frye.2 The Court referred
to its new standard as a flexible inquiry to determine scientific validity
of the proffered testimony with a focus solely on principles and method-
ology 3 The Court also pointed out that FRE 403, which permits a court
to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, is an added safeguard. 4
In a further discussion of the topic of relevance under FRE 702,
Daubert referred to a requirement called "fit."8" The Court explained
this issue as simply "whether expert testimony proffered in the case is
sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in
resolving a factual dispute."86 The problem is that "scientific validity for
one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated
purposes,"8" and the entire forensic DNA process was adapted from
some [federal judges] will be, too." Id. at 600.
Falsifiability of a scientific premise simply refers to whether there is any
evidence that can be offered or there are tests that can be performed, even in
principle, to prove the theory is false. If not, the validity of the theory cannot be
confirmed either.
[W]hat characterizes the empincal method is its manner of exposing to
falsification, in every conceivable way, the system to be tested. Its aim
is not to save the lives of untenable systems but, on the contrary, to
select the one which is by comparison the fittest, by exposing them all
to the fiercest struggle for survival.
KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 42 (1959).
'0 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
81 See id. at 594 (citing United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348 (7th Cir.
1989)).
82 See d. The Court said that a "reliability assessment does not require,
although it does permit, explicit identification of a relevant scientific community
and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that
community." Id. (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir.
1985)).
83 See id. at 594-95.
84 See Id. at 595.
85 Id. at 591.
86 Id.
87 Id., see infra notes 102-35 and accompanyingtext for a discussion of the
importance of DNA "fit" issues.
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the medical diagnostic DNA process, which has a totally different pur-
pose.
It may be premature to determine if Daubert will have any impact on
DNA issues. With courts generally allowing DNA testimony m criminal
cases under the "general acceptance" test of Frye, described by the
Daubert Court as being "rigid!" and "uncompromising," 9 certainly
the more "flexible"9 test of Daubert under FRE 702, designed for
"relaxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony,"91 would not
appear to create major roadblocks. However, the Supreme Court has yet
to enter the playing field to discuss the "fit" portion of Daubert and its
application to DNA.
C. Admissibility by Statute
Many states have enacted statutes92 to cover the admissibility of
DNA evidence in civil and/or criminal cases. 93 Some of them deal
with admissibility in paternity and other civil matters only and say
nothing of criminal proceedings. 94 Some states have established data
88 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
89 Id. at 596.
90 Id. at 594.
9' Id. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169
(1988)).
92 Such statutes could run into difficulty with courts based upon the
separation of powers doctrine because they usurp the judicial function of
determining court rules. In Kentucky, for example, when the legislature passed
the so-called Truth in Sentencing statute (KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 532.055
(Banks-Baldwin 1974)), the Kentucky Supreme Court held in Reneer v.
Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. 1987), that the statute was a violation of
the separation of powers doctrine, but the court upheld the statute based on the
principle of "comity."
93 See ALA. CODE § 36-18-20, -24, -30 (1996); ALASKA STAT. §§
09.25.051, 12.45.035 (Michie 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-168, 54-86k
(1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3515 (1996); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§
5/103-5, 45/11 (West 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-13 (West 1997); LA.
Civ CODE ANN. art. 187 (West 1997); LA. REV STAT. ANN. §§ 15:441.1,
9:397.3 (West 1996); MD. CODE ANN. CTs. & JUD. PRoc. § 10-915 (1996);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 634.25-26 (West 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-13-02
(West 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 751.1 (West 1996); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 24-7-112, -117 (1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.5 (Miclue 1997).
94 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-342 (Michie 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-
46 (1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.716 (West 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN.
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banks95 to obtain and store DNA records of certain people, often persons
convicted of specific felomes or of crimes against persons, 96 m order to
help identify a repeat offender through DNA comparisons. Some of the
state statutes dealing with DNA specifically provide for the admissibility
of such evidence in crinmal cases without expert testimony establishing
the reliability of the evidence."
On the other hand, Alabama's statute allows DNA evidence only by
way of expert testimony if the trial court determines the testimony meets
the requirements of Daubert.98 Alaska's statute does not mention
Daubert but provides that in a criminal proceeding "evidence of a DNA
profile is admissible if the court finds that the technique underlying
the evidence is scientifically valid."99
§ 40-11-13 (Michie 1997); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 418, 532 (McKinney 1997);
Orno REv CODE ANN. § 3111.09, .12 (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
9- See ALA. CODE § 36-18-20, -24 (1996); ALASKA STAT. § 44.41.035
(Michie 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102g (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29,
§ 4713 (1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-60 (1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-1-9-8
(West 1997); ME. REv STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1577 (West 1996); MD. CODE
ANN. OF 1957 art. 88B, § 12A (1996); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 299C.155 (West
1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 650.050 (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-6-102
(1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-266.1 (1996); TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN. §
411.143, .144, .146 (West 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.4 (Michie 1997);
WASH. CODE REV ANN. § 43.43.756, .758 (West 1996); W VA. CODE § 15-2B-
8 (1997).
96 For instance, Alabama's statute specifically states that many types of
crimes are committed by repeat offenders and therefore establishes a DNA data
bank of persons convicted of felomes and attempts to commit felonies. See ALA.
CODE § 36-18-20 (1996).
97 For example, Tennessee provides:
In any civil or criminal trial, hearing or proceeding, the results of DNA
analysis are admissible in evidence without antecedent expert
testimony that DNA analysis provides a trustworthy and reliable method
of identifying characteristics m an individual's genetic material upon a
showing that the offered testimony meets the standards of admissibility
set forth m the Tennessee Rules of Evidence.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-117(b)(1) (1996); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-
13 (West 1997).
98 See ALA. CODE § 36-18-30 (1996).
99 ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.035(a) (Michle 1996). The statute specifically
states that it is not necessary to prove that the DNA evidence has general
acceptance in the relevant scientific community. See id.
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Most statutes do not specifically mention population genetics m
connection with DNA evidence, but Minnesota's law includes one that
does:
In a civil or criminal trial or hearing, statistical population frequency
evidence, based on genetic or blood test results, is admissible to
demonstrate the fraction of the population that would have the same
combination of genetic markers as was found in a specific human
biological specimen. "Genetic marker" means the various blood types
or DNA types that an individual may possess.100
Interestingly, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected such testimony in a
case decided after the statute was enacted, although the statute was not
in effect until after the trial and thus was specifically not considered m
the appeal.
101
IH. TECHNICAL PROBLEMS FOR
ADMISSIBILITY UNDER FRYE AND DAUBERT
A. Problems Concerning the Technology
The scientific principles involved in comparison of DNA profiles are
not a problem either in the scientific community or in the courts. 2 It
is not generally questioned that the underlying theories and even the
techniques used in DNA testing are valid.' The potential problems lie
elsewhere.
When appellate courts first considered the admissibility of DNA
evidence under Frye, the issue was discussed in terms of "general
acceptance" in the scientific community 104 Of course, DNA profiling
through RFLP analysis was accepted by scientists. It had been used for
years in research.'0 5 However, to say that the procedure used for
100 MINN. STAT. § 634.26 (1996).
101 See State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989) (holding that DNA
testing is admissible under Frye, but must be available for independent review
by opposing counsel); discussion infra notes 251-58 and accompanying text.
102 See Scheck, supra note 67
103 See Richard Lempert, The SuspectPopulation andDNA Identification, 34
JURImETRICS J. 1, 2 (1993).
' See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 533 So.2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(discussing the "general acceptance" test at length but ultimately applying a
"relevancy/reliability" test instead).
1o5 See Hoeffel, supra note 22, at 475-76.
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medical diagnosis was accepted by the scientific community is not the
same as saying that the use of DNA in forensics is "generally accepted."
The techniques in the two areas are very different, with many potential
problems m forensics that are not present m medical diagnosis. 
0 6
One obvious, but crucial, difference is that in medicine the samples
of DNA are "clean," with no contamination, and are taken from known
sources. Any questionable or ambiguous results can be repeated for
verification."0 7 The process involves discrete alternatives0 8 and has
a built-in consistency check against artifacts.' 9 It never requires the use
of population genetics or statistical probabilities. In short, diagnostic
DNA is not used to identify a source. 10 On the other hand, the forensic
use of DNA often involves contaminated or degraded samples, possibly
from multiple unknown sources. When the sample from a crime scene is
limited, as it generally is, the test cannot be repeated. Any possible match
then involves the questionable use of statistical analysis of population
genetics to give it significance."'
Mere acceptance of a procedure by research scientists may not be the
best index of whether it should be accepted for identification purposes in
criminal prosecutions."' The probability is very high that the sample
obtained from a crime scene is contaminated with bacteria, which
contains DNA like every other species. The probe could bind with DNA
1"6 Research-onented DNA analysis typically involves comparisons of the
DNA between family members to detect possible inheritance of disease-causing
genes or comparisons with known standards to detect mutations. See Scheck,
supra note 67, at 1964.
107 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 52.
108 For instance, the question might ask whlch of two alleles a child inherited
from a parent. See id.
"0 Artifacts can occur in any laboratory and can lead to an incorrect
interpretation if not recognized. See id. at 52, 54.
110 See Hoeffel, supra note 22, at 478.
.. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 52-53.
"' Research scientists can deal with high rates of error and unreliability in
their procedures. When something interesting is found in an experiment, the
procedure can be repeated many times to assure its accuracy. Errors will stand
out in research procedures because the findings are inconsistent with scientific
knowledge and theory. In a forensic laboratory, the situation is completely
different since tests cannot be repeated, and the only time an error may "stand
out" is when it is mconsistent with the prosecutor's case. See William C.
Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New
Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REv 45, 56-57 (1989).
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from the bacteria and produce a misleading result."' Part of the prob-
lem in People v. Castro,"' the first case to reject the use of DNA
evidence in a criminal trial, involved the use of probes known to be
contaminated with bacteria. Lifecodes, the private company that
conducted the DNA testing, ignored the contaminated probes and declared
the sample to be a match with the defendant's DNA. In order to get a
match between the samples of blood taken from the defendant's watch
and the victim of a murder, Lifecodes chose to ignore two extra bands on
the autoradiograph from the watch stain." 5
An examination of the problems in Castro should bring pause to any
court considering the introduction of DNA evidence, because the case
involved a hearing on admissibility in which experts testified for twelve
weeks. Imtially, Lifecodes declared a match, which led to the criminal
charge. After twelve weeks of expert testimony, some of the Lifecodes
experts changed their minds and recanted their match-call testimony "6
What if Castro had not been represented by Barry Scheck and Peter
Neufeld? What if the defense had not attacked the DNA evidence with
experts of its own, as has been the situation m many trials? The defense
in Castro was able to find many blunders made by Lifecodes in its
procedures that changed the complexion of that case and undoubtedly
influenced the entire recent history of forensic DNA." 7 How many
blunders have gone undetected when the defense did not have the
resources for such an all-out assault on the laboratory9
A process that is so incredibly complex has many facets that can give
rise to problems. Many lawyers and judges"' do not have the knowl-
edge to deal with these issues, or the time to study to become knowledge-
able."9 One aspect of the laboratory environment that can lead to
erroneous interpretation is referred to in the literature as laboratory
"slop' 20 brought about by the "inevitable variability and imperfection
". See Hoeffel, supra note 22, at 480, 482.
"i4 People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989). This case is
discussed at length m Hoeffel, supra note 22, at 477-78.
"' See Hoeffel, supra note 22, at 480.
116 See id. at 478.
117 See id.
11 See supra note 79. In fact, Chief Justice Rehnquist admitted that not even
he understood the meaning of falsifiability. In light of this admission, how will
he deal with the entire DNA issue?
". Not every criminal defendant can afford to hire a separate DNA lawyer
to supplement his regular trial attorney, as O.J. Simpson did.
120 See Hoeffel, supra note 22, at 481.
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of testing conditions., '' 2' For example, the DNA patterns may be
difficult to read for a variety of reasons, such as variations in the
thickness and consistency of the gels used in the electrophoresis
stage or variations m the temperature and voltage level used in the
process.
22
There are many possible errors at every step of the process. For
instance, in the Southern blot procedure, bubbles on the nylon membrane
may prevent the transference of some DNA bands and cause them to
disappear.'" Some faint bands of DNA may be very difficult to see and
thus cause the interpretations to vary 24 There is also disagreement on
the significance of "band shifting" and how to deal with it."z In
addition to these major hurdles, an overall problem is that there are no
"uniform standards and quality controls"126 to ensure common proce-
dures and accurate interpretations of results. There are recommendations,
but no requirements. Some laboratories have adopted the guidelines
published by TWGDAM, 27 a group coordinated by the FBI.
2
1
With all of the complexities of the DNA profiling process, some
experts believe that the most common error in the process is human
error. 29 The National Research Council asserted that laboratory errors
will happen in the best laboratories, "even when the analyst is certain that
every precaution" has been taken to prevent error.'30 The Council
' See id.
'2 See id., Thompson & Ford, supra note 112, at 87 n.188.
' See Thompson & Ford, supra note 112, at 91 n.200.
124 In People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989), experts disagreed
on how many bands they could see. See Hoeffel, supra note 22, at 481.
'2 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 61, see also People
v Keene, 591 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (holding DNA evidence madmissi-
ble when it was Impossible to conclude whether method used by laboratory was
generally accepted); infra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.
126 Hoeffel, supra note 22, at 479 (citing Erie Lander, DNA Fingerprnting
on Trial, 339 NATURE 501 (1989)).
'27 Techmcal Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods.
128 See State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989) (explaining the
nature and work of TWGDAM).
129 See Bennett, supra note 18, at 154 (citing Lawrence B. Ebert, Comment,
Frye after Daubert: The Role of Scientists in Admissibility Issues As Seen
Through Analysis of the DNA Profiling Cases, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 219, 243).
130 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 89.
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pointed out that early m the DNA approach there were high rates of false
positives due to laboratory error.'
With the new criteria for the admissibility of expert testimony set
forth m Daubert,132 some issues that did not arise under the Frye
question of general acceptance could surface.133 For instance, the "fit"
requirement' could lead to some interesting discussions, since the
issue of DNA admissibility deals with whether the undoubtedly valid and
reliable technique used m medicine and diagnostic laboratories can be
transferred to forensics and be equally valid and reliable.'35
B. Problems With Population Genetics and the Product Rule
Problems in getting DNA evidence before a jury often involve
population genetics and the product rule.'36 There is considerable
controversy about the method of obtaining a statistical correlation
between the sample and the population as a whole. 7 As stated previ-
ously, the statistical significance of a match is determined m a two-step
process.33 First, the probability of each matching band being present
in a sample by random chance is ascertained using a database of DNA
profiles. Second, the probability of all matching bands being present by
random chance is calculated by multiplying the frequencies of each
separate band.'39 For instance, if the odds of the first band being
located in a random sample are five in one hundred and the odds of
the second band are seven m one hundred, the overall odds of both
being found m the same sample, thirty-five m ten thousand, are deter-
mined by multiplying those two figures. When this number is multiplied
two or three more times, the odds against a random match become very
high.
131 See id. at 88-89.
132 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
133 See Frye v. United States, 293 F 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), discussedsupra
notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
13' This requires "proof that a scientific techmque is valid for the purpose to
which it is being applied." Scheck, supra note 67, at 1962.
13' For a thorough discussion of some of the techmcal pitfalls in the process
of DNA profiling that are beyond the scope of this Note, see Hoeffel, supra note
22, and Scheck, supra note 67, and the many references therein.
136 See, e.g., State v Bible, 858 P.2d 1152 (Ariz. 1993).
131 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 74-75.
131 See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
139 See Scheck, supra note 67, at 1970-71.
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One problem with this process is the size of the database. There is no
consensus for how large a database must be to accurately represent the
entire population. One estimate states the probability that two persons
might by chance have the same DNA profile as one m thirty billion. This
was based on a study of fourteen British Caucasans.140 Studies pub-
lished by Lifecodes, the testing laboratory in Castro,' consisted of the
DNA profiles of between 200 and 300 people taken from blood banks m
the New York area. 1
42
Another problem arises from two major assumptions that provide the
entire basis for this statistical evidence.'43 The first necessary assump-
tion is that the population database used for comparison is in Hardy-
Weinberg equilibrium." This requires that there be no correlation
between the two alleles, one from the mother and one from the father,
found at the same locus.'4 In other words, the mating process must be
completely random.'46 The other assumption underlying the validity of
the product rule is that the bands produced by each probe are independent
of the bands produced by the other probes. 47 In technical terms, the
assumption is that they are in "linkage equilibrium."
1 48
One of the major problems with these assumptions is that they
discount the possibility of the existence of subgroups within the
140 See Hoeffel, supra note 22, at 488-89 (citing Jeffreys et al., supra note
56, at 68).
41 People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
142 See Thompson & Ford, supra note 112, at 84 n.177
141 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNcIL, supra note 2, at 5.
" "Hardy-Wemberg equilibrium depends on a truly random population with
a thoroughly mixed gene-pool." Bennett, supra note 18, at 151.
14S See id. (citing Sherry J. Whitney, Note, State v. Bible: The Admissibility
of Forensic DNA Profiling and Statistical Probability Evidence in Arizona
Criminal Proceedings, 26 ARiz. ST. L.J. 593, 600 (1994)); infra notes 255-58
and accompanying text (discussing State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152 (Ariz. 1993),
which held that evidence should have been excluded because statistical methods
were not accepted by scientific community).
146 The term "random mating" refers to the assumption that alleles will not
have some influence on mate selection. See Thompson & Ford, supra note 112,
at 85.
"' See zd.
148 See R.C. Lewontin & Daniel L. Hartl, Population Genetics in Forensic
DNA Typing, 254 SCIENCE 1745, 1747-49 (1991).
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population where there are distinct allele frequencies.149 Such subgroups
may occur in a given population when the mating is not entirely
random, 50 and these subgroups may have allele frequencies very
different from the population as a whole."' Databases generally are
divided into classes based on race, such as Caucasian, black, and
Hispaic, and ignore evidence of genetic substructures within these broad
categories. 52 They also ignore the fact that such groups do not mate
completely randomly ' If there is a population substructure within the
broad racial group"' of the database, it is not valid to assume mdepen-
dence of the alleles, and therefore the product rule is not valid. 5
How the product rule can create a small but misleading percentage is
demonstrated by calculating the percentage of fair-skinned, blond, blue-
eyed people m Europe. First, if a survey showed that one in ten people
were blond, one in ten people had blue eyes, and one in ten people had
fair skin, the product rule would multiply .1 by .1 by .1 to determine the
frequency of all three characteristics appearing in one person: 1 in 1000.
Yet that figure would be very misleading because it ignores the fact that
such traits tend to occur together in Nordic people, and the actual
probability of persons having all three traits would be much higher than
the 1 m 1000 obtained by the product rule.'56 Clearly, some alleles are
not independent of each other despite procedural assumptions. 7
Since there is not a counterpart in the diagnostic use of DNA
profiling to the population genetics and product rule required for it to be
used in forensics, it has been more difficult for prosecutors to show
general scientific acceptance of this procedure under the Frye rule.58
149 See id.
so See Elizabeth A. Allen, Note, The Admissibility of DNA Evidence in
Washington After State v Cauthron, 69 WASH. L. REv 383, 388 (1994).
See NATIONAL RESEARCH CouNciL, supra note 2, at 48.
152 See Lewontin & Hartl, supra note 148, at 1746.
153 See Zd.
4 Tis would be a subgroup whose allele frequencies would differ
significantly from the loci used by the laboratories.
155 See Scheck, supra note 67, at 1971.
156 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 76.
... The FBI has begun to reassess the assumptions. While generally using
databases consisting of either Caucasians, blacks, or Hispamcs, the FBI plans m
the future to use databases obtained from nearby regions rather than the national
race-basedpools of the population at large. See Christopher Anderson, FBI Gives
in on Genetics, 355 NATURE 663, 663 (Feb. 1992).
'5 See, e.g., State v Bible, 858 P.2d 1152 (Arz. 1993) (discussed infra notes
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Due in part to the controversy generated by these problems, some courts
have refused to allow DNA evidence.
59
C. Recommendations of the National Research Council
1. 1992 Recommendations
Because of the rising tide of questions about DNA typing in the
aftermath of many well-publicized criminal cases, calls were made for an
rn-depth study of the problems, as well as recommendations, relating to
DNA testing. 60 The first study by the National Research Council
("NRC") was concluded and published in 1992.16 The reaction to the
report and its recommendations was mixed. The FBI protested that it was
pro-defendant, 62 while some population geneticists claimed it favored
the prosecution.'63 Some courts have reversed convictions based upon
the report"6 and have cited it as evidence of a lack of general accep-
tance of the statistical methods of interpreting data.
61
Noting the lack of disagreement concerning the underlying principles
of DNA typing, the NRC emphasized that there still could be a question
of whether a particular typing method is "scientifically appropriate
166
for forensic use. The Council reported that "too many methods exist or
are planned, and too many issues must be addressed m detail"'67 for the
report to provide techmcal descriptions of DNA typing. The report even
made a disparaging comment about legislation that authorizes the
admission of DNA results into evidence, 68 calling such statutes "vague-
255-58 and accompanying text).
159 See infra notes 251-58 and accompanying text.
160 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at vii.
161 See Kenneth R. Kreiling, DNA Technology in Forensic Science, 33
JURIMETlICS J. 449, 459 (1993).
162 See Deftos, supra note 28, at 964.
163 See Kreiling, supra note 161, at 458-59.
'64 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cumin, 565 N.E.2d 440 (Mass. 1991). See
infra notes 251-58 and accompanying text for discussion.
165 See, e.g., People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 725 (Ct. App. 1993);
People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 739 (Ct. App. 1992), abrogated by
People v. Wilds, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351 (Ct. App.), review granted 39 Cal. Rptr.
2d 406 (1995).
116 The report stated that it is "meaningless" to speak of the reliability of
DNA profiling in general without specific reference to a particular method.
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 52.
167 id.
168 See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
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ly worded" and suggesting that they be limited to the only method m
general use at the time.'69
One of the procedures recommended by the NRC to help authenticate
a match result is the practice of sample splitting 7 ° suggested by critics
of forensic laboratories. 7 ' "The idea is to split the DNA sample being
examined and have it tested independently by two or more different
laboratories using different DNA loci and different 'match' criteria."' 72
Tlus procedure, one of the few ways in which a DNA match can be
tested, is significant given Daubert's admissibility standards, which
include "testability" as a factor.'73
One of the most important recommendations made by the NRC
regarding the procedures used for DNA typing was that an accreditation
program be established requiring all laboratories conducting DNA testing
to be accredited and to follow standard protocols. A failure to obtain
accreditation after a suitable period of time would render test results
inadmissible in court. The most controversial recommendation of the
NRC suggests the use of a modification of the product rule, the statistical
method generally used to calculate the frequency of a possible random
match. The NRC called its modification the "ceiling principle."'74 The
ceiling principle is designed to obtain a much more conservative
frequency figure. The method involves taking random samples from
fifteen or twenty different genetically homogeneous groups and determin-
ing the allele frequency at certain loci. Then, when applying the product
rule, the laboratory would use either the actual frequency of the alleles
as found in the subgroups, or five percent, whichever is higher.'75 This
169 This would be the "conventionalRFLP analysis of single-locus probes on
Southern blots." The report said, "We trust that courts will recognize the
limitations inherent in such statutes." NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note
2, at 52.
170 See id. at 67
171 See generally Richard Lempert, Some Caveats Concerning DNA as
Criminal Identification Evidence: With Thanks to the Reverend Bayes, 13
CARDozO L. REV 303 (1991).
172 Scheck, supra note 67, at 1969.
173 See id.
'74 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 82. There are several
technical recommendations made by the NRC that are beyond the scope of this
Note. See id. at 72-73.
175 The purpose of sampling various populations is to examine whether
some alleles have considerably higher frequencies in particular
subgroups than in the general population - presumably because of
[Vol. 86
FoRENsIC DNA IN CRINAL CASES
approach to calculating population frequencies has been criticized both as
"extremely conservative'" and as not conservative enough. 177 In
response to the criticism and the promise of the FBI to fund another
study, the NRC agreed to reconsider this recommendation.
178
2. 1996 Recommendations
After further studies, the NRC published another book that modified
the ongmal recommendations. An early report on the findings released in
May 1996 revealed the NRC's new position: Since sufficient data has
been obtained for various subgroups, it is no longer necessary to utilize
the "ceiling principle" previously recommended. 179 The NRC continues
to recommend accreditation for laboratories conducting DNA profiling
and various processes to assure quality control. These include the
genetic drift. It is matches at such alleles that might be accorded too
much evidentiary weight, if the general population frequency were used
m calculating the probability of a match.
Id. at 83-84.
176 B. Devlin et al., Statistical Evaluation ofDNA Fingerpnnting: A Critique
of the NRC's Report, 259 SCIENCE 748, 837 (1993).
,7' See Jennifer R. Slimowitz & Joel E. Cohen, Violations of the Ceiling
Prnciple: Exact Conditions and Statistical Evidence, 53 AM. J. HuM. GENETICS
314 (1993).
178 See Scheck, supra note 67, at 1972; see also infra notes 219-24 and
accompanying text.
179 See Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 10 CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL
202 (May 22, 1996). In proposing the elimination of the ceiling principles
recommended in the 1992 book, the new National Research Council book
suggested that any error in the frequencies based upon the now conceded effects
of subpopulations would be less than ten fold m either direction of the result
reached from the general product rule. Thus, in place of any ceiling principle it
recommended that the frequencies of a random match be estimated to be within
a factor of ten of the actual number obtained from the product rule. See
NATIONAL RESEARCH CouNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENsIC DNA EVIDENCE
156-58 (1996). The new book suggested that with probabilities of one in 100
million or less, an error of ten fold either way would not effect the result. Id. at
151. This book further pointed out that the Kentucky State Police Forensic Crime
Laboratory uses the population of the United States as a cut off point, simply
saying that the probability of a random match is less than one in whatever the
population is, rather than an actual lower number such as one in a billion. Tins




confirmatory testing of split samples, preferably by a separate laboratory,
to avoid match errors. The NRC also recommends that laboratories adopt
and adhere to standards such as those developed by TWGDAM and urges
further research into the use of marker systems, with respect to quantity
and quality, with a goal of making each DNA profile unique (except for
identical twins)' °
IV ADMISSIBILITY IN KENTUCKY AND SELECTED OTHER STATES
A. Treatment of DNA in Kentucky
Kentucky has no statute specifically referring to the admissibility of
DNA evidence, so this decision is left to the discretion of the trial court.
There are only two reported cases that have ruled on the admissibility of
DNA evidence. In Hams v. Commonwealth' and Mitchell v. Com-
monwealth' the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the trial judge
did not abuse his or her discretion in permitting the introduction of DNA
evidence." 3 The first case, Hams, was decided under the Frye general
acceptability regime. 4 The second case, Mitchell, was decided after
Daubert85and therefore sinply adopted the test set forth in
Daubert.8 6 Since Kentucky's rule on expert testimony, Kentucky Rule of
Evidence 702, is a duplication of FRE 702, on the basis of which
Daubert was decided, 1 7 the court simply reiterated the general require-
ments discussed in Daubert and concluded that the trial court had not
abused its discretion.
The critical aspect of Kentucky's case law thus far has been the
court's refusal to state categorically that DNA evidence is per se
admissible. Both decisions limited their holdings to the facts involved,
180 See Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., supra note 179, at 203-04.
181 Hams v Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 678 (Ky. 1992), overruled by
Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 100 (Ky. 1995).
18 Mitchell v Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 100 (Ky. 1995), overruling
Hams v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 678 (Ky. (1992).
183 See Hams, 846 S.W.2d at 678; Mitchell, 908 S.W.2d at 100.
14 See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
185 See supra notes 70-91 and accompanying text.
186 Mitchell overruled Hams insofar as the standard used in the latter was
said to be Frye.
187 KY. R. EviD. 702 became effective in July 1992 after the trial in Hams.
See Mitchell, 908 S.W.2d at 101.
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with the simple ruling that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The
Supreme Court of Kentucky has left open the general issue of DNA
admissibility until the proper case comes along, specifically one where a
hearing is held with experts called by both sides or by the trial court"'8
to supplement or rebut the prosecution's case."89
The evidence m Hams concerning DNA was that "the DNA profile
of the semen found on the [rape] victim matched the DNA profile of the
blood given by Hams.""' A special agent from an FBI laboratory
testified at trial that all four probes matched, and "the 'likelihood of
finding another unrelated individual from the black population, having a
DNA profile like Mr. Hams, is approximately one in eight million.' ,19'
A pretrial motion had been filed in the case to preclude the mtroduc-
tion of DNA evidence. A pre-trial hearing'92 was held in which the
Commonwealth called two experts to testify, and the defense called
none. The first expert, Dr. Dwight Adams of the FBI laboratory,
testified to the procedure used for obtaining a DNA sample from a
vaginal swab and analyzing it. He said that the FBI used the RFLP
technology and that this type of analysis had been used "in the medical
field for the diagnosis of cancer and other diseases since the late 1970s
or early 1980s and that the FBI began to use DNA for identification
purposes in the md-1980s."' 94 With regard to the accuracy of the
procedure, he stated that the FBI had a protocol for the analysis of RFLP
that was followed all the way through and never vaned.'95 He testified
that he routinely is subject to proficiency tests and that he "has yet to
188 The Hams court said it was "unwilling, at this time, to embrace
conclusively this 'extraordinarily powerful and promising innovation."' Hams,
846 S.W.2d at 681 (quoting United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 59 (8th
Cir. 1990), appeal dismissed, 925 F.2d 1127 (1991)).
.89 The court has stated that, at least for now, it will consider DNA evidence
on a case-by-case basis. See id., Mitchell, 908 S.W.2d at 101.
190 Hams, 846 S.W.2d at 679.
' ' Id. (quoting Dr. Dwight Adams, special agent in the DNA Analysis Unit).
192 The hearing was held on October 3, 1990. Id. at 680. Tins would have
been before much of the controversy about DNA, including the NRC report of
1992 (see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2) and the NATURE (see
Lander, supra note 126) article from 1992, in which the FBI apparently backed
away from some of its assumptions concerning the statistical calculations.





make a mistake on a test."'196 He also opined that the statistical method
used was "very conservative.""'
The other expert witness was Dr. David Goldman, Chief of Genetics
Research at the National Institute of Health and an expert in molecular
biology and population genetics. He testified that the DNA testing
procedures used by the FBI were variations of procedures that were in
very wide use, that there were no substantial differences in the tests, and
that they were "extraordinarily accurate." ' He noted that these tests
have undergone extensive peer review and are widely accepted m the
scientific commumty and that the frequency calculations are "conservative
and objective."' 99
The trial court concluded that since thirty-eight states had accepted
this procedure and since DNA testing was widely accepted by the
scientific community as a "reliable and accurate technological procedure,
its results were admissible."2 "0 Concluding that the trial court had not
abused its discretion m letting the evidence m, the court nevertheless held
that since DNA profiling is a relatively new procedure and "has been the
subject of controversy in both the legal and scientific fields,"2 1 it
would be prudent to determine admissibility on a case-by-case basis. 2
The next case was Mitchell, decided in 1995 after more national
controversy on the DNA issue. The Kentucky Supreme Court refused to
rule that DNA is either not admissible per se or that it is admissible per
se, still opting for a case-by-case analysis.0" The court stated that
Daubert required a pretrial hearing for the judge to determine whether
"the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically
valid and whether that reasoning or methodology can be applied to







199 Id.200 Id. at 681.
201 Id. (citing United States v Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 58 (8th Cir. 1990),
appeal dismissed, 925 F.2d 1127 (1991)). Of course, there was no issue of
identity in the trial since the defendant had confessed to the police and had even
testified at the trial admitting to the rape and burglary. The only issue was
sodomy, where DNA evidence was not implicated. That may have been why the
defense called no witnesses to fight the admssion of DNA evidence. See id.
202 See id.
203 See Mitchell v Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 100, 101 (Ky. 1995).
204Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
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The court stated that the requirement that the testimony "pertain to
'scientific knowledge' establishes a standard of 'evidentiary reliabili-
ty ,,205 A trial court should consider (1) "whether the scientific knowl-
edge being presented has been tested, whether it has been subject to peer
review, and publication"; (2) the "evidence's known rate of error"; and
(3) "whether the evidence has a particular degree of acceptance m the
relevant commumty,
206
In Mitchell, as m Hams, the defendant had confessed to the
police."7 Perhaps the confession helped authenticate the match by the
laboratory and acted as a sufficient test of the procedure. At any rate,
both Kentucky cases involved instances where the defendant had
confessed, thus making the DNA evidence superfluous. In Mitchell the
court did not discuss the specific details of the DNA evidence as it did
m Hams, but simply concluded that there was no abuse of discretion
under the requirements of Daubert.°8
The Kentucky Supreme Court is certainly aware of the controversy
over this type of evidence, having cited cases m Hams from the
beginning of the controversy 209 A true test of admissibility will occur
only when DNA evidence plays a major role in a case and there is expert
testimony on both sides. Only then can the court focus on all of the
controversial issues to be decided.
It should be realized that it has been less than one decade since
forensic DNA jumped into the legal arena.21 0 It was touted in the
beginning as the "greatest boon to forensic medicine and law since
fingerprinting,"21' with claims like "disputing the technology is like
disputing the law of gravity,"2 '2 and statistical estimates of a random
(1993)).
205 Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579).
206 Id. at 102 (quoting LESLIE ABRAMSON, KENTUCKY PRACTICE: CRIMINAL
PRACnTCE AND PROCEDURE § 27.83 n.2 (Supp. 1994)).
207 See id.
208 See zd.
209 See Hams v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 678, 681 (Ky. 1992) (citing
United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, appeal dismissed, 925 F.2d 1127 (8th
Cir. 1991); Commonwealth v Cumin, 565 N.E.2d 440 (Mass. 1991)).
210 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 1 (stating that the
FBI began using DNA in cases m 1988. The first appellate decision on DNA was
Andrews v. State, 533 So.2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
211 Hoeffel, supra note 22, at 466 (citing Jean L. Marx, DNA Fingerpnnting
Takes the Witness Stand, 240 SCIENCE 1616 (1988)).2 2Id. (citing Debra Cassens Moss, DNA - The New Fingerprints, A.B.A.
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match going into the millions or billions.21a Yet, after lengthy hearings,
some of the tests have been shown to be badly flawed.214 There has
also been a considerable amount of controversy concerning the statistical
evidence before and after the NRC recommended a major change
concerning the product rule in 1992.215 Had the NRC's ceiling principle
been applied to the cases where the frequency rates were stated to be in
the millions or billions, the probability of a random match would have
been considerably different.216
The NRC recommended many changes m 1992, including accredita-
tion of testing laboratories and sample splitting, long after many courts
had permitted the use of DNA evidence without such safeguards. Many
states have enacted statutes requiring DNA evidence to be admitted, even
without expert testimony to accompany it.217 The NRC has criticized
this type of blanket statute. There is a serious lack of consistency among
the players m the DNA field. Since the huge numbers can be very
prejudicial, it is important that scientists achieve a consensus at some
point. A sampling of some of the cases in other jurisdictions on this
controversial subject shows the wisdom of the Kentucky Supreme Court
in adopting a wait-and-see, case-by-case attitude.
B. Cases from Other States That Have Admitted DNA Evidence
While it is true that many states have permitted the introduction of
DNA evidence, that fact alone is not dispositive of any issue. Many of
those cases involved the ill-conceived statutes criticized by the NRC,218
while in others the defense either did not object to the admission of DNA
evidence or called no expert witnesses to rebut the prosecution's
evidence. In addition, the methodology used for a specific case may be
different from that used for another. That fact should be considered, in
light of Daubert and Mitchell, in determining if the specific technique
meets the standards of admissibility It is not simply DNA that is at issue,
but the particular techmque used by the testing laboratory, the database
J., May 1, 1988, at 66, 69-70 (paraphrasmg David Housman, Professor of
Biology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology)).
213 See supra note 16.
214 See infra notes 242-50 and accompanying text.
215 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COuNcIL, supra note 2, at 82.
216 The ceilingprnciple is much more conservativethan the standardproduct
rule. See id. at 83.
217 See supra note 95.
218 See NATIONAL RESEARCH CoUNcIL, supra note 2, at 52.
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used to find a match, and the validity of the statistical calculations.2 9
Accordingly, the decisions of other courts that have permitted the use of
DNA evidence are no more controlling than those that have rejected it.
A study of the individual cases shows, however, that there exists much
controversy within the field. Significant scientific controversy should
be settled by scientists, not courts, and the subject of the controver-
sy should not be admitted into evidence until the controversy is set-
tled.
220
In Andrews v. State,22 DNA evidence, including statistical calcula-
tions showing the odds of a random match as being one in 800 million,
was deemed admissible. 2 That court found persuasive the fact that
DNA had been used for years in the diagnosis and treatment of diseases.
The case, decided m 1988, predated almost all of the controversy
surrounding the use of DNA evidence. 2' Another case permitted DNA
evidence and statistical analysis showing odds of one m 234 billion of a
random match.'2 4 In these cases, the NRC recommendation in 1992
concerning the use of a ceiling principle would have lowered these odds
by millions and billions, respectively '
Washington v. Copeland226 admitted both DNA evidence and
statistical calculations, holding that the standard for admissibility m
Washington was still the general acceptance test of Frye, even though
Washington had a statute identical to the Federal Rule of Evidence
interpreted m Daubert, and the case was decided long after Daubert. 7
The court believed that judges "'do not have the expertise required to
219 See NATIONAL RESEARCH CouNciL, supra note 2, at 52.
220 See Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 371 (Md. 1978) (opining that courts
should be reluctant to resolve the disputes of science. "It is not for the law to
experiment but for science.") (citing State v. Cary, 239 A.2d 680, 684 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968)).
1 Andrews v. State, 533 So.2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
222 This was the first appellate court to approve the use of DNA-typing
evidence in a criminal case. See Bennett, supra note 18, at 141.
' The Castro decision, which was the first case to reject DNA evidence,
was decided in 1989. See People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
The Hoeffel Note, see supra note 22, which discussed many significant problems
with DNA evidence, was published in 1990.
224 See Martinez v. State, 549 So.2d 694 (Fla. 1989).
2 See NATIONAL RESEARCH CouNcIL, supra note 2.
226 State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304 (Wash. 1996).
227 See id. at 1314-15.
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decide whether a challenged scientific theory is correct"' 22" and added
that the court does not itself assess the validity of scientific evidence.229
United States v. Bonds,"° decided by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, is further illustrative of the DNA problem.
The trial court allowed DNA evidence in, then a year after the convic-
tions and while the case was on appeal, the NRC published its book with
recommendations and criticisms of the current procedures." Affirming
the trial court's decision to permit the introduction of DNA evidence, the
Sixth Circuit refused to permit consideration of the NRC book in the
appeal and ordered references thereto to be struck from the appellant's
brief. 2 This case, therefore, is of limited significance since the NRC
recommendations will be relevant in any case arising after their promul-
gation.
In Bonds, using a database of its own agents,2 3 the FBI, m April
1989, originally calculated the odds of a random match as being one in
270,000.? Thereafter, in May 1990, the FBI modified its procedures
and revised its match estimate to one in 35,000. The latter was used in
court.2"' The standard for admissibility at the time of the trial was FRE
702, before the Supreme Court interpreted it in Daubert.2 6 Daubert
was decided while the appeal was pending, so the appellate court
examined the evidence from the hearing and applied the rules of Daubert
to it. The appellate attorneys, however, were not provided an opportunity
to brief the new issues.237
United States v. Bonds is a perfect example why the Supreme Court
of Kentucky has been wise to adopt a wait-and-see approach. The entire
DNA profiling process was undergoing change before, during, and after
228 Id. at 1312 (quoting State v Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 505 (Wash. 1993),
partially abrogated by State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304 (1996)).
229 See id.
230 United States v Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993).
231 See NATIONAL RESEARCH CoUNCIL, supra note 2.
232 See Bonds, 12 F.3d at 551-53.
233 The database consisted of 225 randomly chosen Caucasian agents. See id.
at 551 n.5.
234 The FBI had just begun using DNA in case work shortly before this, in
late 1988.
235 See Bonds, 12 F.3d at 550 n.3, 551.
236 The trial occurred in 1991, one year before the NRC report was released.
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2.
237 The case was argued in December of 1992 and decided m December
1993, with rehearing demed in February 1994. See Bonds, 12 F.3d at 540.
[Vol. 86
FORENSIC DNA iN CRRIMNAL CASES
the trial, with more changes arising during the appeal. No procedure
could be deemed "generally accepted" by the scientific community
because numerous changes were occurring rapidly 
238
Another issue of concern arises when the published protocol for
profiling DNA is not followed by a laboratory Is the result still reliable?
Does the procedure used still pass the "general acceptance" test? The
more specific issue is whether this goes to the admissibility of the
profiling evidence or its weight. The federal circuits have split on this
issue, with the Eighth Circuit ruling that it goes to the admissibility of the
evidence, 9 while the Ninth Circuit holds that it only goes to its
weight.240 Daubert does not provide any guidance in resolving this
issue.
241
C. Cases From Other States That Have Refused Admission
1. Refusal to Admit All DNA Evidence
The only casesthat have rejected DNA evidence outright have done
so on the basis of faulty technique, not because the theory or scientific
validity of DNA profiling was in doubt.242 In People v. Castro, during
the twelve-week hearing to determine the admissibility of DNA evidence
that showed a match, the state's expert witness from the testing laboratory
testified that, among other problems, the laboratory continued to use a
probe even though it had been contaminated with bacteria and that was
known early in the process.243 In addition, in order to call a match, the
laboratory simply ignored extra bands that were observed in one sample,
not testing them to see if they were the result of contamination. Based on
the problems with the specific work done by the laboratory in that
instance, DNA evidence was rejected by the court, although its use was
not ruled out in general. 2"
238 The case exemplifies the problem with announcing a rigid rule of law
where technology and procedures are undergoing fairly rapid changes.
" See United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191 (8th Cir. 1993).
240 See United States v. Cluscilly, 30 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1994).
241 See James E. Starrs, Recent Developments in Federal and State Rules
Pertaining to Medical and Scientific Expert Testimony, 34 DUQ. L. REv 813,
837 (1996).
242 See Bennett, supra note 18, at 170.




In State v. Schwartz,24 DNA evidence showing a match was not
admitted because the testing laboratory had not conformed with appropri-
ate quality control standards.246 One problem cited by the court was that
a match call was made on certain samples even though the band patterns
did not fit the laboratory's match standards. Further, the court pointed out
that during blind proficiency tests, the laboratory had incorrectly
identified two of forty-four samples as coming from the same subject,
which, according to some experts, was above the acceptable error rate
threshold. The laboratory had also failed to publish data concerning its
methodology 247
Failure to offer any evidence of general scientific acceptance of the
protocol of the RFLP methodology and failure to show that the statistical
analysis was performed in accordance with accepted methodology were
fatal in People v. Venegas.24 Similarly, in People v. Keene,249 dis-
agreement by expert witnesses as to whether a method used by the
laboratory to correct for band shifting was generally accepted in the
molecular genetics community prevented admissibility of DNA evidence,
where no other forensics laboratory used the procedure."
The fact that few courts have rejected DNA evidence, although it has
been offered in many cases, reflects the relative ease with which
prosecutors may introduce testimony that a match exists. The science on
the actual profiling does not appear to be in dispute, and either there is
very little controversy concerning a particular methodology, or the issues
simply have not been raised in the trial. That leaves population genetics
as the primary area of dispute.
2. Refusal to Admit Evidence of Population Genetics
By far the greatest concern expressed by courts dealing with the
complexities of DNA profiling has been in the area of statistical analysis
245 State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989).
246 See id. at 428.
247 See Id. at 426-27
248 See People v. Venegas, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 856, 863-64 (Ct. App.), review
granted, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 408 (1995). But see People v Givens, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d
816, 824 & n.12 (Ct. App.) (noting that several decisions of the Califorma Court
of Appeal had concluded that use of the product rule was no longer in doubt and
that the California Supreme Court had granted review in all of those cases),
review granted, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 577 (Cal. 1997).
249 People v. Keene, 591 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
250 See id. at 740.
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of the frequency of a random match. Since the release of the NRC report,
many courts have deemed such evidence inadmissible.2"'
In State v. Pennell,252 the court refused to permit evidence of the
frequency of a DNA pattern because the database from which the
evidence was derived had not been shown to be in Hardy-Wemberg
equilibrium.253 The possibility of a random match was one in 180
billion, according to the laboratory, but if the database was not m Hardy-
Weinberg equilibrium, the laboratory's use of probability statistics could
not be considered to be based on reliable scientific assumptions.254
In State v. Bible,255 the court stated that it was indisputable that the
statistical method for calculating the frequencies of random matches was
not accepted by the scientific community and that the trial court had erred
by admitting probability testimony based on the product rule. 6 Some
courts have reversed cases based on the recommendations of the NRC
report, ruling that the report indicated a lack of general acceptance of the
then-current method of interpreting the data.257 There have been several
other cases where evidence of low frequency rates based on the product
rule was not allowed. 8
251 See Scheck, supra note 67, at 1965 n.20 (stating that "the overwhelming
majority of appellate decisions in Frye jurisdictions [since the publication of the
NRC report] have rejected methods used by the major forensic laboratories for
making statistical estimates").
252 Statev. Pennell, No. Crnn. A- W88-12-0051, 1989 WL 167430 (Del. Sup.
Ct. Nov. 6, 1989).
2 See id. at *1.
4 See id. at *5.
'5 State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152 (Arz. 1993).
256 See id. at 1188 n.27 (citing People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 744
(Ct. App. 1992), abrogated by People v. Wilds, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351 (Ct. App.),
review granted, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 406 (1995)).
" See, e.g., People v. Wallace, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993);
Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731. But see People v. Wilds, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351,
352 (Cal. Ct. App.) (stating, in upholding the use of DNA evidence, that the
"blight [that] had come over the landscape of general acceptance," as discussed
in Barney, "ha[d] now passed"), review granted, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 406 (1995).
"8 See People v. Venegas, 36 Cal. Rptr. 856 (Ct. App.), review granted, 39
Cal. Rptr. 2d 408 (1995); State v. Sivn, 646 A.2d 169 (Conn. 1994); Common-
wealth v. Cutmm, 565 N.E.2d 440 (Mass. 1991); State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d
422 (Minn. 1989); State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483 (N.H. 1992); State v
Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502 (Wash. 1993), partially abrogated by State v. Copeland,
922 P.2d 1304 (1996). But see Caldwell v. State, 393 S.E.2d 436, 444 (Ga.




The Supreme Court of Kentucky's decision to take a wait-and-see
attitude shows an understanding of the great amount of controversy that
has surrounded the new forensic adaptation of medical and diagnostic
analysis of DNA. The NRC, m both its 1992 report and 1996 report,
made several recommendations for laboratories conducting DNA testing.
One of the most sigmficant aspects of both reports is the suggestion that
courts disallow any evidence from an unaccredited laboratory 9 If the
evidence shows that a laboratory has not complied with the recommenda-
tions, the Kentucky Supreme Court should refuse to permit DNA
evidence.
The Kentucky high court's patience in avoiding a definitive ruling is
commendable in view of the magnitude of the controversy that has raged
around this highly complex issue. The NRC itself has said that the
technology of DNA profiling is always changing. To say that DNA
evidence is admissible in all cases without specifying which test was
used, whether the protocol was properly followed, or whether the
database was shown to be in Hardy-Wemberg equilibrium is sunply to
ignore the issues. Until all of the issues are resolved by the scientists in
the field, a case-by-case approach is the only reasonable way to handle
the question of whether DNA evidence is admissible, because rapidly
changing technology makes the accuracy of one test not necessarily a true
measure of the accuracy of all procedures.260
unusual position of allowing m DNA testimony if the probability figure was
calculatedbased on "the most conservative of all estimates").
25 See Bureau of National Affatrs, Inc., supra note 179, at 204.
260 At the time of publication, the FBI crime lab's DNA unit had recently
announced that the agency's techniques for matching DNA samples to a single
individual have matured to the point where an FBI expert witness can state flatly,
without qualification, that there is a DNA match. This conclusiveness is shown
when the probability exceeds one in 260 billion. The Earth's population is
approximately 5.8 billion. The FBI currently uses six different genetic pattern
sites, with two more to be added next year. Each new site increases the odds that
a DNA match will be unique to one individual and exclude others from
possibility. A new technique called chemilummescence allows DNA to be
processed in two weeks instead of the previous three-month lag time. Paul Recer,
FBI Says DNA Evidence Technique Now Improved to Certainty, THE ASSOCIAT-
ED PREss, Nov. 12, 1997
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